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There has been a great deal of research regarding the relationship between 
national culture and aviation safety (e.g. Braithwaite, 2001; Helmreich and 
Merritt, 1998; Jing, Lu and Peng, 2001; Lund and Aaro, 2004; Merritt and 
Maurino, 2004; Patankar, 2003; Rose, 2004).  Soeters and Boer (2000) suggested 
that safety was enhanced when national culture was more individualistic in nature.  
They also noted that the greater the degree of collectivism in the culture of a 
country, the greater the pre-disposition towards regulation and the greater the 
degree of ‘power distance’ (Hofstede, 2001) which led to an increased likelihood 
of accidents.  Helmreich and Merritt (1998) proposed that culture fashions a 
complex framework of national, organisational and professional attitudes and 
values within which groups and individuals function.  The power of culture often 
goes unrecognised since it represents ‘the way we do things here’.  In a similar 
vein to national culture, Reason (1997) defined corporate culture as ‘...the set of 
unwritten rules that govern acceptable behaviour within and outside the 
organisation.  It emanates from the strategic apex of the company and colours all 
of its activities’.  Pidgeon and O’Leary (1994) suggested that a good safety 
culture’s concern for safety is distributed and endorsed throughout the 
organisation.  Maurino (1992) wrote ‘... the design and corporate culture of an 
organization exert powerful influence on how safely it functions.  Pilots, 
controllers, and other operational personnel do not act in a vacuum – instead they 
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mirror the policies and practices of the organizations to which they belong.’  
(Cited in Braithwaite, 2001). 
Morley and Harris (2006) developed an open system model of safety culture – 
the Ripple Model (see figure 1).  This model identified three threads running 
throughout the personnel within (and without) an organisation, irrespective of 
their level and role.  These were labelled ‘Concerns’, ‘Influences’ and ‘Actions’ 
and were evident in line personnel; middle management; senior management; the 
industry regulator; government and society as a whole.  Concerns were associated 
with threats to the needs of the individual and worries about meeting the 
requirements placed on them by others.  Influences were concerned with the 
factors that dictated the methods by which safety needs could be accomplished.  
Actions described the behaviours that directly impacted upon safety, in either a 
positive or negative manner.  In this model the authors argued that elements 
outside an organization have a profound effect on safety culture.  The boundaries 
for the conceptualisation of safety culture must be extended beyond the 
organisation if a comprehensive model of the evolution of safety culture is to be 




Figure 1   Layers of influence and categories comprising the Ripple Model 
of safety culture (Morley and Harris, 2006). 
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There is an argument against the concept that safety culture is distinct to 
organisational culture.  The safety culture of an organisation is one of many 
cultures to which a worker will simultaneously belong.  Authors such as Merritt 
and Helmreich (1995) and Glendon and Stanton (2000) propose that safety culture 
is a sub-culture of organisational culture, which is itself a sub-culture of the 
industry culture, which in turn is a sub-culture of national culture (cf. Hofstede’s 
conceptualisation of culture).  If attempts to separate safety culture from 
organisational culture are difficult enough trying to fully separate these entities 
from national culture is almost impossible.   
The manner in which the various layers and dimensions of safety culture 
operates can be illustrated with reference to accident case studies.  In this case, the 
accident in question is that involving China Airlines (CAL) flight CI-611.  
 
 
Summary of China Airlines CI-611 accident 
 
On May 25 2002, 15:29 Taipei local time China Airlines (CAL) Flight 
CI611, a Boeing 747-200 crashed into the Taiwan Strait approximately 23 
nautical miles northeast of Makung, Penghu Islands of Taiwan, Republic of 
China (ROC).  Radar data indicated that the aircraft experienced an in-
flight breakup at an altitude of 34,900 feet, before reached its cruising 
altitude of 35,000 feet.  The aircraft was on a scheduled passenger flight 
from Chiang Kai-Shek (CKS) International Airport, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC to 
Chek Lap Kok International Airport, Hong Kong, China. One hundred and 
seventy-five of the 225 occupants on board the CI611 flight, which included 
206 passengers and 19 crewmembers, sustained fatal injuries; the 
remainders are missing and presumed killed  
In February 7 1980, the accident aircraft suffered a tail strike occurrence in 
Hong Kong.  The aircraft was ferried back to Taiwan on the same day un-
pressurized and a temporary repair was conducted the day after.  A permanent 
repair was conducted on May 23 through 26, 1980.  The permanent repair of 
the tail strike was not accomplished in accordance with the Boeing SRM 
[Structural Repair Manual], in that the area of damaged skin in Section 46 was 
not removed (trimmed) and the repair doubler did not extend sufficiently 
beyond the entire damaged area to restore the structural strength.  According to 
maintenance records, starting from November 1997, B-18255 had a total of 29 
CPCP [Corrosion Prevention and Control Program] inspection items that were 
not accomplished in accordance with the CAL AMP [Aircraft Maintenance 
Program] and the Boeing 747 Aging Airplane Corrosion Prevention & Control 
Program.  The aircraft had been operated with unresolved safety deficiencies 
from November 1997 onward.  The CPCP scheduling deficiencies in the CAL 
maintenance inspection practices were not identified by the CAA audits.  
(Aviation Safety Council Report AOR-05-02-001) 
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Table 1 contains an analysis of the China Airlines CI-611 in-flight breakup 
accident within the framework provided by the Ripple Model.  It provides a 
summary of the actions, influences and concerns described at the various levels in 
the model. The arrows between the elements are intended only to demonstrate the 
complexity of the interactions taking place between elements of the system in the 
lead up to the accident.  They do not necessarily imply causality and do not 
represent an exhaustive list of the factors which were instrumental in bringing 
about the accident.  The numbers in parentheses in the following sub-sections 
indicate the section numbers of the accident report (Aviation Safety Council 
Report AOR-05-02-001) which supports the observation.  
 
Line personnel at China Airlines 
 
Concerns The actions taken to keep the aircraft flying despite numerous 
maintenance deferrals can be related to line personnel’s concerns to accomplish 
the job in time.  It is suggested that this was a direct product of the CAL 
organizational culture.  
 
Influences The China Airlines case illustrates some of the influences such as the 
desire to keep the aircraft flying coupled with a lack of experience with permanent 
repair.  Line personnel were highly motivated to keep the aircraft flying and took 
the steps necessary to do this.  However, some of the risks this regard were 
attributable to a lack of skill and knowledge on the part of line personnel and a 
lack of equipment and resources (2.3.3). 
 
Actions The inquiry identified numerous active failures at the line level which 
contributed to the accident including failure to follow the SRM  (Structural Repair 
Manual) for repairing of the tail strike 22 years prior to the accident (2.3.1.1); a 
failure to detect structural defects (1.6.4.4), and poor cleanliness of the bilge area 
(1.6.8) which hindered inspection. 
 
Middle management at China Airlines 
 
Concerns China Airlines prior to the accident had undergone a considerable 
organizational restructure.  The concern in this case was to support and achieve 
flight operational objectives (1.17.1.1).  
 
Influences Middle management at CAL were inexperienced with the self-auditing 
system and its required documentation (2.4.4.3) and there was a lack of 
communication between MOC (Maintenance Operation Center) and MPS 
(Maintenance Planning Section) (2.4.4.1) in the airline.   
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Table 1 The Ripple Model applied to CAL CI-611 accident 
 
 Concerns Influences Actions 
Society 
 
The safety of air transport 
Cheap flights 
High power-distance 
culture; high uncertainty 
avoidance  
Avoid conflict and 
confrontation (where 
possible) 
Government Concerned to make 
everybody happy (both 
airlines and society) 
Concerned about 
promoting economics 
growth and improving 
aviation safety 
Need to balance conflict 
between the airlines and 
CAA (safety; profit and 
regulation versus 
economic and tourism 
growth)  
Not a member of ICAO 
Oversight of the fact that 
the regulator had been 
ineffective in dealing with 
CAL for a long period  
Regulator Successful implementation 
of government ‘open sky’ 
policy 
Problems accessing update 
information for safety 
operation  
Increased regulatory load 
resulting from the 
government’s  ‘open sky’ 
policy  
 
Failure to identify CPCP 
scheduling deficiencies of 
CAL 
Inadequate supervision of 
CAL since 1997 
No specific audit system 
and failing to provide both 
flight safety inspection 
training and handbook for 
inspectors 
Senior Mgt. Concerned with benefits 
and profits of the 
organization and its 
shareholders 
 
Overly focussed on the 
economic environment  
 
Aircraft operated with 
unresolved safety 
deficiencies since 1997 
Communication problems 
between CAL and Boeing 
FSR 
Inadequate supervision of 
CPCP  




Lack of communication 
between MOC and MPS 
A tendency to focus on the 
job at hand while 
neglecting to document 
maintenance activities 
 
Failure to inspect 29 CPCP 
items from Nov. 1997 
No (or incomplete) 
maintenance records 
before the accident 
Failure to provide adequate 




To accomplish the job on 
time and a desire to keep 
the aircraft flying 
 
 
A lack of experience with 
permanent repair 
Poor lighting and 
equipment for structural 
inspections 
Failure to detect structural 
defects 
Failure to follow SRM for 
repairing of the tail strike 
22 years prior to the 
accident (1980) 
Bilge area was not clean 
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Actions Some of the actions which contribute to the development of a positive 
safety culture at the middle management level were lacking at CAL.  For example, 
little effort was expended by CAL middle management to ensure safety inspections 
took place.  There was a failure to inspect 29 CPCP items since 1997 (2.4.4.2).  
There was little coaching of safe behaviour to line personnel and failures to provide 
adequate lighting (2.4.1.1.2) and magnifying glasses (2.4.1.1.3) for inspections. 
 
Senior management at China Airlines 
 
Concerns CAL had a ‘flight safety enhancement’ project between 1995 and 1999 
(1.17.1.1).  However, as a result of the influence of increased competition, the 
commercial imperative was probably becoming the prime concern of senior 
management at CAL.  As one of the roles of senior management is to ensure that the 
organization continues to exist, the primary concern facing senior management 
during this period would appear to have been the viability and survival of the airline. 
 
Influences The economic environment in aviation was becoming very competitive 
as a result of the government’s ‘open sky’ policy (1.17.3.1).  There were lots of 
new airlines joining the aviation market 
 
Actions The development of a safety culture is largely a top down process.  The 
communication of an organizational mission which includes safety, organizing work 
operations to achieve that mission and striving for continuous improvement in terms 
of safety are key actions of senior management to create a safety culture.  A lack of 
such actions on the part of senior management at CAL has already been identified.  
Aircraft had operated with safety deficiencies since 1997 (2.4.4.2).  There were also 
communication problems between CAL and Boeing Field Service Representatives – 




Concerns  The ‘open sky policy’ had considerably increased the workload of the 
ROC CAA.  To cope with the flourishing aviation industry, another amendment 
for the organizational rules of CAA was drafted in 1998 (1.17.3.1). 
 
Influences The regulatory authority at the time had no specific audit system (1.17.3.6).  
The ROC is not an ICAO contracting state, therefore there was no official approach 
for assessing and updating safety information and the ICAO did not evaluate the 
safety of flight operations administered by the ROC CAA (1.17.3.7).  
 
Actions The ROC CAA was criticised in the report of the commission for failing 
to provide flight safety inspection training, a handbook for inspectors (1.17.3.6) 
and for failing to properly scrutinise the operations of CAL (2.4.5).   
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The Government 
 
Concerns The primary concern of the government was to making everybody 
happy by ensuring the stability of the government itself through the promotion of 
economic growth and fostering a positive image of aviation safety. 
 
Influences The government of the day needed to balance the conflict between the 
airlines and CAA.  The issues facing the ROC government included promoting the 
‘open sky policy’ to encourage economic development; encourage competition 
among the airlines to reduce the cost of air travel to the passenger while at the 
same time demanding a greater degree of aviation safety. 
 
Actions The most significant actions of the government in shaping the safety 
culture operating at CAL were as a result of an earlier major accident in 1998.  
The introduction of a re-structuring programme at CAL led to the governmental 
oversight of the fact that regulator was ineffective in dealing with CAL for a long 




It is at the societal level where the influence of national culture on safety culture is 
perhaps most obvious.  Safety culture is merely a sub-set of national culture, and 
national cultural characteristics are all pervasive throughout all levels in the ‘Ripple 
Model’.  However, it is on the dimension of influences where national culture 
meets corporate and safety culture.  It is suggested that there is an almost universal 
desire in society for the safety of air transport and for cheap flights (concerns), 
however, it is on the dimension of influences (and hence indirectly safety actions) 
that national culture plays its part. National culture provides a fundamental basis 
for a group member’s behaviour, social roles and cognitive processes and it also 
provides the underlying rules concerning safety and communication Taiwan can be 
characterised as a culture which has a high power distance, is collectivist in nature, 
feminine and exhibits high uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 2001).  Soeters and 
Boer (2000) have identified such national cultures as having a poor safety record 
but mere description and categorisation alone has little (or no) explanatory power 
in describing why these cultures appear to be more accident prone.  
According to Hofstede’s classification, the Taiwanese culture is predisposed 
toward organisations with tall, centralised decision structures and which have a 
large proportion of supervisory personnel.  In these cultures subordinates expect to 
be told what to do.  However, members of these high power distance cultures 
frequently experience role ambiguity and overload.  Group decisions are preferred 
but information is constrained and controlled by the hierarchy and there is 
resistance to change.  Members of society in high power distance countries are 
also unlikely to speak out when their opinions may contradict those of their 
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superiors.  Confrontation is generally avoided.  Low power distance and high 
individualism promotes greater autonomy of action at the lower levels of an 
organisation.  The Taiwanese culture on the other hand, which is less reactive as a 
result of its preferred organizational structures that discourage autonomy, is also 
resistant to change.  Uncertainty avoidance reflects how the members of a society 
perceive the potential threat posed by uncertain situations and the extent to which 
they subsequently try to avoid these situations by means of regulation and/or 
bureaucratic sanction.  Taiwan is a strong uncertainty avoidance culture.  
Organisations tend to demonstrate a great deal of hierarchical control with a 
highly formalized concept of management.  The power of superiors depends upon 
the control of uncertainties. 
These cultural aspects are evident in the influences and subsequent actions 
outlined in table 1.  There are many layers of management but little action in 
terms of auditing and oversight which may have resulted in conflict. There is a 
great deal of concern to satisfy the requirements of the government, shareholders 
or the objectives of senior management even when resources and equipment were 
inadequate.  It is noticeable from this analysis that the actions of entities outside 
China Airlines and the companies Senior Management had a direct impact to the 
actions of personnel closer to the operation itself (middle management and line 
personnel).  
It is suggested that the study of safety culture within an organisation is 
meaningless without reference to the wider context.  The inter-relationship 
between concerns, influences and subsequent actions needs to be understood.  A 
high level of concern for safety coupled with the appropriate influences promoting 
safety (particularly at higher levels of management and governmental levels) 
should lead to appropriate and effective actions.  However, these latter factors are 
as much a product of national culture as they are of safety culture. A government 
responds to society’s influence, concerns and even actions not directly, but 
through the actions of a regulator. The regulator’s requirements are translated into 
actions by several layers of management.  At each level of management and 
society the actions and influences at work differ.  However, these actions can only 
be interpreted in light of the less overt influences and concerns that drive them, 
such as that of national culture, hence the requirements for an ‘open systems’ 
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